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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee SPX Corporation ("SPX") agrees with the jurisdictional statement found in 
the brief of appellants/plaintiffs (hereafter "plaintiffs"). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Can there be reversible prejudicial error in an instruction on superseding cause 
where the jury on special interrogatories found no liability and did not reach the issue of 
proximate cause? 
2. Was there prejudicial error in the jury instruction on superseding cause; what 
was the source of any such error? 
3. Plaintiffs' brief raises the issue of a trial court ruling on personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant Schneider Canada, Inc. For its part, SPX submits that the question of 
personal jurisdiction is not an issue on appeal; SPX received a jury verdict and judgment 
finding it not liable for injuries resulting from the product it manufactures. No claim about 
any product defect can now be asserted against SPX arising from the accident of Aaron 
Gardner. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for jury instructions to which counsel has objected is 
correctness; the standard of review for reversal because of any claimed error in instructions 
is prejudice substantially affecting the outcome in the trial court. Hanks v. Christensen. 354 
P.2d 564 (Utah 1960); A. K. &R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Constr.. 977 P.2d 
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518 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
ISSUE PRESERVATION 
SPX disagrees with the statement in plaintiffs' brief of paragraph 2 under the heading, 
"Issue Preservation." Plaintiffs objected to the trial court instructing the jury on superseding 
cause; however, the instruction, identified as Instruction No. 48 and given by the trial court 
in a somewhat modified form, was submitted by plaintiffs. (R. 2254.) Under Rule 51(f) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs cannot properly complain of any error claimed 
to result from the language of the instruction they submitted. 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-817, et. seq. (2009), and known as the Utah 
Liability Reform Act. 
2. The former Utah Comparative Negligence Act of 1973, formerly codified at 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-38, et. seq. 
Copies of both statutes are in the attached Addendum under Tab 1 and Tab 2, 
respectively. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict rendered against them and in favor 
of appellees SPX and HO J Engineering and Sales. At trial in June 2009, the jury answered 
a special verdict form. (R. 2269-2272.) The jury answered three questions: (1) "No" to the 
question: Was SPX negligent in the design of its product?; (2) "No" to the question of 
-3-
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whether SPX manufactured and sold a defectively designed product; and (3) "No" to the 
question of whether HO J Engineering and Sales was negligent. The negative answer to these 
three questions determined all issues of liability in favor of SPX. (The special verdict form 
is included in the Addendum under Tab 3.) 
Given the jury's responses to the foregoing questions, none of the verdict form's five 
proximate cause questions needed to be answered, and the jury did not do so. 
Plaintiffs' only argument to reverse the judgment against SPX is the trial court's 
claimed error in the giving of a superseding cause instruction. The jury never reached the 
issues of causation on the special verdict form. 
Plaintiffs also appeal a pretrial ruling of April 2007 in which the trial court dismissed 
without prejudice plaintiffs' claims asserted against Sclineider Canada, Inc. The dismissal 
was based on lack of personal jurisdiction. For reasons stated in this brief, the correctness 
of the trial court's ruling on personal jurisdiction can have no affect on SPX. The jury's 
detemiination and the resulting judgment foreclose any claim against SPX arising out of any 
defect in the dock leveler involved in the fatal accident to Aaron Gardner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs' decedent, Aaron Gardner, was killed on November 2, 2002 on 
loading dock number 51 at the warehouse facility of Sysco Intermountain Foods, Inc. in 
West Jordan, Utah. Mr. Gardner was an employee of Sysco and had just finished a Saturday 
morning delivery run. (R. 891.) 
-4-
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2. The accident occurred when a large metal plate forming part of a dock leveler 
designed and manufactured by SPX's predecessor in interest, Serco, unexpectedly lowered 
from the vertical position and caught Mr. Gardner between it and the rear door of his delivery 
truck. (R. 891.) 
3. The dock leveler was designed to permit ease in loading and unloading delivery 
trucks. The retractable metal plate was an essential part of the design. It permitted material 
to be loaded and unloaded from the back end of delivery trucks. The plate could be raised 
or lowered to allow for height adjustments for loading and unloading, and also to permit the 
closing of warehouse doors. (R. 2428 at 120, 122.) 
4. The initial complaint was filed on or about October 14, 2004. The plaintiffs 
are decedent's wife Ginger Gardner and the decedent's three surviving children. (R. Vol. 1, 
1-15.) 
5. SPX and HO J Engineering & Sales were named as defendants in the original 
complaint. (R. 1-15.) 
6. HOJ installed the dock leveler in question. (R. 891.) 
7. Schneider Canada was named as a defendant in the Fourth Amended Complaint 
filed on or about June 8, 2006. (R. 915.) 
8. Schneider Canada manufactured an electrical switch used in the control system 
of the dock leveler; plaintiffs asserted that this switch was a defective component of the dock 
leveler. The switch is also called an auxiliary contact block. (R. 2423 at 23-24, 218-29.) 
-5-
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9. The trial court dismissed Schneider Canada without prejudice by 
"Memorandum Opinion and Order" dated April 11, 2006. The dismissal was based on lack 
of personal jurisdiction. (R. 2294-2306.) 
10. Jury trial began on June 8, 2009 and lasted through June 16, 2009. (R. 2205, 
2217-18, 2219-22, 2255-56, 2273-74.) 
11. At trial, plaintiffs called a number of witnesses. Four of these were experts, 
including two engineering experts, Fred Smith and Scott Kimbrough. (R. 2217,2218,2219, 
2220, 2221 and 2255.) Plaintiffs also offered and had received into evidence forty-eight 
exhibits. (R. 2258-2265.) 
12. The case was submitted to the jury on a special verdict form; the form 
contained twelve questions. Mr. Gardner's employer, Sysco, was included on the form for 
a percentage of fault allocation. (R. 2270-2272.) The jury answered the first three of the 
questions; specifically, they found that SPX and HOJ were not negligent. They also found 
that SPX was not liable for a defective product. (R. 2268-2272.) 
13. The verdict form contained five questions on proximate cause, numbers 2, 4, 
6, 8 and 10. In accordance with the instructions on the verdict form, none of the questions 
concerning causation were answered since all liability questions were answered, "No." (R. 
2268-2271,2272.) 
14. Though the jury never reached the questions of proximate cause on the special 
verdict form, plaintiffs now claim error in the instruction on superseding cause. The 
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superseding cause instruction given by the trial court was in a modified fomi of a written 
instruction submitted by plaintiffs. (Plaintiffs' submitted instruction is found at R. 2254.) 
The instruction read to the jury is found at R. 2306-07. 
15. SPX and HOJ did not ask for the instruction on superseding cause quoted at 
page 24 of plaintiffs' brief. Plaintiffs submitted the instruction, which read: 
INSTRUCTION NO-
SUPERSEDING CAUSE. 
SPX Corporation claims that it is not liable for the plaintiffs' 
harm because of the later fault of another party. To avoid liability for 
the harm, SPX Corporation must prove all of the following: 
(1) that the other party's conduct occurred after SPX 
Corporation's conduct; 
(2) that a reasonable person would consider the other party's 
conduct extraordinary; 
(3) that SPX Corporation could not foresee that the other party 
would act in an intentional manner; and 
(4) that the harm resulting from the other party's conduct was 
different from the kind of harm that could have been reasonably 
expected from SPX Corporation's conduct. (R. 2254.) 
MUJI IT.CV210, Alternative A 
Plaintiffs object to using any instruction on superseding cause. However, should the Court 
choose to use such an instruction, Plaintiffs submit this instruction to be used in lieu of SPX 
Corporation's proposed instruction. [Emphasis added.] 
16. The language at the bottom of the submitted instruction clearly shows (1) 
plaintiffs' objection to any superseding cause instruction and (2) that plaintiffs submitted the 
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instruction in "lieu of SPX Corporation's proposed instruction." (R. 2251.) (The instruction 
is attached in the Addendum hereto under Tab 4.) 
17. The trial court gave the following instruction as number 48: 
48. SUPERSEDING CAUSE. 
Defendants claim that it is not liable for the Plaintiffs5 harm 
because of the later fault of another party. To avoid liability for the 
harm, Defendants must prove all of the following: 
(1) that the other party's conduct occurred after Defendants' 
conduct; 
(2) that a reasonable person would consider the other party's 
conduct extraordinary; 
(3) that Defendants could not foresee that the other party would 
act in an intentional manner; and 
(4) that the harm resulting from the other party's conduct was 
different from the kind of harm that could have been reasonably 
expected from Defendants' conduct. (R. 2306-2307.) 
[Emphasis added.] 
This instruction is attached in the Addendum hereto under Tab 5. 
18. The difference in these two instructions is, essentially, the substitution of 
"Defendants" for "SPX" in appellant's written instruction. 
19. SPX submitted an instruction defining superseding cause in terms of 
negligence, violation of statute, and extraordinary and unforeseeable behavior by the 
intervening actor. SPX's submitted instruction did not limit the superseding cause to a cause 
resulting from only intentional conduct. (R. 2031.) 
-8-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Any complaint of error in the giving or formulation of the legal standard found in the 
superseding cause instruction read to the jury is moot; any claimed error is harmless. In 
answering the special verdict form, the jury never reached the issue of proximate cause, let 
alone superseding cause. The predicate for the jury to reach the question of proximate cause 
- a finding of negligence or fault - was resolved in favor of SPX and HO J. 
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court should not have given any instruction on 
superseding cause because of the enactment of the Liability Reform Act in 1986. Utah Code 
Ami. § 78B-5-817, et. seq. formerly found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37, et. seq. There is 
no legal authority either in the statute or the Utah appellate decisions for the proposition that 
the statute has eliminated superseding cause, either as a consideration for detemiining 
proximate cause or as a proper jury instruction. 
If there was any error in Instruction 48, that error was created by plaintiffs in the 
language of the instruction they submitted. Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to show how 
Instruction 48 harmed or prejudiced them in any way affecting the outcome of the case. 
Plaintiffs' claims against SPX have been litigated and resolved against them, 
including any claim asserted for liability because of the alleged defective auxiliary contact 
switch manufactured by Schneider Canada and incorporated into the dock leveler sold by 
SPX's predecessor. Plaintiffs5 claims against SPX are now barred by res judicata and 
collateral estoppel; given the jury verdict, the personal jurisdiction question over Schneider 
-9-
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Canada is moot as to SPX. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT ABOUT INSTRUCTION NO- 48 IS MOOT; ANY 
ERROR IS HARMLESS. 
As stated, the jury never reached the issue of proximate cause, let alone the question 
of superseding cause, in its answers to the special verdict form. The jury stopped its 
deliberations by finding no liability against either SPX or HOJ. Thus, any argument about 
Instruction 48 is moot; the giving of the instruction did not affect the outcome of the case. 
The question of mootness resulting from a finding of no liability before the jury reached the 
question of proximate cause has been decided by the Utah Supreme Court inHanks.354?.2d 
at 564. 
Hanks involved an action for damages resulting from claimed negligence in the setting 
of a brush fire which ultimately spread and damaged fences and forage on plaintiffs grazing 
land. The case was tried to a jury and submitted to it on a special verdict from. The jury 
answered the form by finding the defendant not negligent. On appeal, the plaintiff 
complained about an instruction on superseding cause. The instruction stated that if "an 
'unusual and unexpected high wind arose . . . and carried the fire where it would not 
otherwise have spread5... the defendant would not be responsible." Hanks. 354 P.2d at 567. 
The court declined to consider any objection to the superseding cause instruction. It 
did so in the following language: 
. . . [B]y answers to specific interrogatories as to whether the defendant was 
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negligent either in setting the fires or in tending them, the jury found that he 
was not. There being no negligence upon which to predicate liability, the 
question of the extent of proximate causation of damage is not here 
confronted. 
Hanks. 354?2d at 561. 
Arguments about superseding cause are moot in this case for the precise reasons stated 
in Hanks: the jury found SPX and HO J not to be negligent and not otherwise liable. 
The decision in Hanks is, of course, consistent with subsequent Utah appellate law. 
See Butler v. Nay lor, 987 P.2d 41 (Utah 1999) (in medical malpractice action, any error in 
jury instruction was harmless as jury could have reached verdict under other theories of 
recovery); Steffensen v. Smith ys Mgt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993) (teclinical errors in 
proximate cause instruction were hamiless); Eskelsonv. Ballhaus. 622 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980) 
(hamiless error in failure to give proper comparative negligence instructions). 
II. SUPERSEDING CAUSE IS STILL THE LAW IN UTAH; INSTRUCTIONS ON 
SUPERSEDING CAUSE ARE PROPER 
Plaintiffs' brief at page 25 argues that superseding cause is no longer the law in Utah 
because of the 1986 adoption of the Liability Reform Act. U.C.A. § 78B-5-817, et. seq. 
Plaintiffs cite no provisions of the Act nor legislative history to support this contention. The 
only portion of the statute quoted in plaintiffs' brief is the definition of "fault" found at § 
78B-5-817(2).] The quoted language requires proximate cause as a condition to a finding of 
]The quoted language reads: The LRA defines fault as, 'any actionable breach of 
legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injuries or damages 
sustained by a person, including negligence in all its degrees' " (Plaintiffs' brief at p. 25; 
emphasis added.) 
-11-
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fault. By implication, the quoted language still includes superseding cause as a part of the 
determination for a finding of fault where a superseding cause is at issue. Nothing in the 
quoted language in plaintiffs' brief suggests the elimination of superseding cause as part of 
the required proximate cause determination. 
In support of their claims of incompatibility, plaintiffs' brief cites only one Utah case 
- Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). The citation is remarkable. 
Harris involved the proper legal standard of jury instruction for superseding cause. The 
Harris court overruled a prior c&se - Hillyardy. Utah By-Products, Co.. 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 
1953). The issue was whether foreseeability of the intervening cause was a necessary 
element of a superseding cause instruction. The court held foreseeability to be required and 
cited Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 447 (1965) as the standard. Section 447 had 
previously been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jensen v. Mountain States 
Tel & TeL Co.. 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). 
The Harris court clarified and stated a standard for superseding cause. That standard 
included negligence of the intervening actor, whose actions must be extraordinary and 
unforeseeable for superseding case to be an appropriate limitation on proximate cause. 
Harris does not support plaintiffs' contention that superseding cause is inconsistent with the 
Liability Reform Act. 
Plaintiffs' assertion of the incompatibility of superseding cause and the Liability 
Reform Act also is inconsistent with Utah appellate decisions. Utah first introduced 
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comparative negligence in 1973. The Liability Reform Act was passed in 1986. Since 1973, 
Utah appellate decisions have not suggested the incompatibility of superseding cause in any 
analysis of comparative negligence or fault. The history has been to the contrary. 
A trenchant example of the continuing vitality of superseding cause is Steffensen, a 
case which involved both a Court of Appeals' decision and a further review by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals' decision is reported at 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); the Supreme Court opinion is reported at 862P.2d 1342. 
The facts in Steffensen involved an injury to a grocery store patron. She was knocked 
over and injured when a shoplifter ran into her as the shoplifter tried to avoid arrest by two 
store employees. 
The trial court granted a partial directed verdict on the ground that defendant's failure 
to deter the shoplifting could not be a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. This ruling 
was then made part of the trial court's instructions to the jury. The jury found the defendant 
negligent, but it also found that the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of 
the plaintiff s injuries. 
Significantly, both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals found the 
trial judge's instruction on superseding cause to be technically incorrect. The lower court 
had instructed the jury on the issue of foreseeability of the intervening acts of the shoplifter 
in terms of the name and the specific acts performed by the identified shoplifter. Both courts 
characterized the error as harmless, but suggested that a proper superseding cause instruction 
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should instruct on the general risk posed by all shoplifters under the circumstances. 
Steffensen was decided in 1993, seven years after the enactment of the Liability 
Reform Act. It shows superseding cause is still alive and evolving as a doctrine in the Utah 
courts. 
Other Utah appellate decisions demonstrate the viability of superseding cause as part 
of Utah law. For example, in Godesh> v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984), the 
plaintiff sued Provo City for injuries he suffered when he came in contact with an electrical 
wire while he was working on a roof. Provo City was the supplier of the electricity. 
The trial court entered judgment in plaintiffs favor and Provo City appealed. The 
Supreme Court affmned. It held that the trial court acted properly in refusing to rule as a 
matter of law that the roofing contractor's intervening negligence was the sole proximate 
cause of its employee's injuries. The Supreme Court also stated that the instructions given 
to the jury on intervening cause were proper and consistent with the authority of Harris. 671 
P.2dat217. 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). the heirs of a hotel 
guest brought an action against a Salt Lake City hotel for wrongful death. Plaintiffs' 
decedent was, apparently, murdered in the bathroom of the room in which he was staying. 
Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the hotel had not maintained adequate security to protect 
its guests from the apparent murder. The trial court granted the hotel's motion for summary 
judgment. On appeal, this judgment was affimied on the basis that any negligence by the 
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hotel in failing to provide adequate security was not directly linked by any suggestion of 
evidence between those inadequate measures and the apparent cause of death. 697 P.2d at 
246. The court did state that proximate cause could be found "if the intervening agency was 
itself a foreseeable act." hL However, the court held summary judgment was still proper 
because of the lack of any evidence as to exactly how any failure to provide security led to 
the death of plaintiffs'decedent. 
In Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc.. 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). cert, denied 
795 P.2d 1138 (1990), the plaintiff was severely injured in an automobile accident. The 
vehicle in which plaintiff was riding was driven by his father. For unexplained reasons, the 
vehicle left its lane of traffic and struck the rear of a truck and semi-trailer unit parked on a 
paved shoulder of the road. 
At trial, plaintiff conceded his father was negligent "and partially at fault." 781 P.2d 
at 446. The court decided that the defendant also was negligent and directed a verdict of 
negligence against the defendant. The court reserved the issue of the defendant's negligence 
as "a proximate cause" of the accident. On a special verdict form, the jury concluded that 
the father's negligence was the "intervening and sole proximate cause" of plaintiff s injuries. 
Id. This Court affirmed that jury finding. See also Magana v. Dave Roth Construction. 215 
P.3d 143, 149 (Utah2009) (standardproximate cause analysis used);McCorvevv. UDOT* 
868 P.2d 4L 44-45 (Utah 1993) (Utah Supreme Court approved trial court's superseding 
cause instruction); MitchelL 697 P.2d at 240. 
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At pages 26 and 27, plaintiffs' brief cites four cases from jurisdictions other than Utah 
in support of its assertion that superseding cause is incompatible with comparative 
negligence or comparative fault. 
The Connecticut case of Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 820 A.2d. 258 (Conn. 
2003) involved a products liability claim for defective roof brackets which apparently failed 
and caused construction workers to fall from a roof. On a special verdict form, the jury 
found that the roof bracket was defective and unreasonably dangerous. The jury also found 
that the defective condition was a proximate cause of the claimed accident. The jury, 
however, also found that the conduct of the injured workers and their employer was a 
superseding cause of the accident, "that supercedes and cuts off any liability on the part of 
the defendants." The jury's superseding cause determination was in answer to a specific 
question on the verdict form. 820 A.2d at 262. It was this specific jury finding of 
superseding cause after a finding of proximate cause that brought the issue to the Connecticut 
Supreme Court for its evaluation of the status of superseding cause under Connecticut law. 
The question reached by the Comiecticut court cannot be reached by this Court as the jury 
in the instant case made no finding of proximate cause nor superseding cause. 
The second cited case is the New Mexico decision in Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co.. 987 
P.2d386(N.M. 1999). The plaintiff and his wife brought a personal injury action against an 
electric utility for injuries suffered when a metal rod came into contact with a high voltage 
conductor. The jury returned a special verdict finding that the utility had been negligent but 
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that this negligence had not proximately caused Torres' injuries. Again, the issue on appeal 
concerned the question of proximate cause because the jury's finding, unlike the case now 
before this Court, had led to the necessity of reaching the superseding cause issue.2 
The third case is Commonwealth v. BabitL 111 S.W.3d 786 GC. 2005). This judicial 
decision involved two administrative claims against the Kentucky Department of Highways 
for injuries allegedly occurring because of inadequate protective devices and warnings used 
and given by the department in construction zones on Kentucky highways. Neither claim 
presented the procedural issues presented by the present appeal.3 The particular * 
administrative body in question to resolve the claims against the government department was 
the Board of Claims. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that: (1) comparative fault 
applies to actions before the Board of Claims and (2) motorist's negligence in driving vehicle 
off roadway was not a superseding cause preventing the transportation department from 
being liable for its own negligence. Obviously, this was a case decided under particular 
conditions, both procedural and substantive, under Kentucky law, and has little bearing on 
this action. 
Finally, plaintiffs' brief refers to Herrara v. Quality Pontiac* 73 P.3d 181 (N. M. 
2The facts in Torres are very close to the facts hi Godeskv, 690 P.2d at 54L cited 
on page 14 of this brief. As described, Godesky was decided on standard grounds of 
proximate cause and superseding cause. 
3The issues present in the instant case and not present in Babitt are: (1) giving of a 
jury instruction on superseding proximate cause and (2) whether such instruction could be 
error when the jury did not reach the issue of proximate cause. 
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2003). This case is interesting because it presents an issue which also has been decided in 
Utah on traditional proximate and superseding cause grounds. The issue in that case was 
whether one who leaves the keys in the ignition of an unattended and unlocked car owed a 
duty of care to individuals injured in automobile accidents when a thief stole the car and 
negligently or criminally caused an accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Cruz v MiddlekauffLincoln-Mercury, 
Inc.. 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996). In Cruz, the dealership had a policy of leaving the keys in 
the ignition. A vehicle was stolen from the dealer's lot, and a negligence action was brought 
against the dealer for injuries caused when the car was stolen and the thief crashed the stolen 
vehicle into plaintiffs' auto while trying to avoid arrest. 
The trial court denied the dealer's motion to dismiss. The dealer sought interlocutory 
review. On review, the Utah Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient 
special circumstances surrounding the dealership's policy of leaving the keys in the ignition 
to create a duty whose breach could serve as a basis for liability. If the thief s criminal acts 
were foreseeable by the dealer, this foreseeability could permit a finding of proximate cause, 
even though the acts of the thief may be deemed to have been intervening causes. 909 P.2d 
at 1256,1257. Thus, Cruz was decided on established grounds of proximate and superseding 
cause. Of further note is the fact that Cruz was decided in 1996, some ten years after the 
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enactment of the Liability Reform Act.4 
Plaintiffs' claim that superseding cause is not compatible with the Liability Reform 
Act is a public policy argument requesting this Court to change the law. Whatever merits the 
public policy argument might have, such a change in the law is (1) inconsistent with the Utah 
appellate decisions and (2) cannot be based on the giving of a superseding cause instruction 
that was moot and was neither harmful nor prejudicial. 
Moreover, plaintiffs' policy argument is flawed. There still is a logical and 
meaningful need for the concept of superseding causation in Utah. This need exists even 
though parties are only liable for the portion of the wrong they proximately caused. 
Proximate cause is distinguished from "but for" causation by the notion that it is the legal 
cause of a wrongful injury. See Raab v. UtahRy. Co.. 2009 UT 61. 1123, 221 P.3d 219. 
What may otherwise be a legal (proximate) cause of an injury ceases to be the legal cause if 
there is a subsequent event that is so significant (and usually unforeseeable) that it supersedes 
and breaks the chain of legal (proximate) causation. 
III. THE GIVING OF JURY INSTRUCTION 48 DID NOT AND COULD NOT 
PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs' brief makes no meaningful effort to show harm or prejudice by the giving 
of Instruction 48. Plaintiffs' claims of prejudice are stated at pages 28, 29 and 30 of their 
brief. These pages cite no instance of specific prejudice. Plaintiffs only offer speculation 
4The Cruz opinion cited Mitchell 697 P.2d 240 and also this Court's decision in 
Steffensen.%20?2dm. 909 P.2d at 1257. 
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and alleged possible "confusion." The last two paragraphs on page 29 and the first full 
paragraph on page 30 of plaintiffs'brief assert only: 
1. It is "unclear, what, if any, intentional act was done by Sysco;" 
2. It is "impossible" to determine if the jury made its "determination" to relieve 
SPX and HOJ of liability because of Instruction 48; and 
3. The instruction was "confusing." 
The claim of "confusion" is especially remarkable. Plaintiffs state at page 30 of their 
brief: 
This instruction was also improper as it was confusing. Specifically, it should 
not have been given since there were no following instructions defining 
intentional manner, extraordinary harm and setting out certain facts of the case. 
The quoted language complains about inadequacies in the language of an instruction 
which plaintiffs themselves submitted. Particularly remarkable is the claim of the 
incompleteness of the language "defining intentional manner." Plaintiffs submitted this 
language, argued for it, and persuaded the trial court to give it. (R. 2427 at 197-202.) 
Having obtained the language they wanted, plaintiffs now complain that it was error to give 
it. 
Plaintiffs cannot now on appeal complain of any "confusion" created by the 
instruction. Plaintiffs did not and could not object to the language of the instruction as 
required by Rule 51(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule requires: (1) an 
objection and (2) an identification of the "subject matter to which the objection is made" 
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along with "the grounds for the objection." Obviously, plaintiffs did not satisfy the rule's 
clearly stated requirements, and their complaints about the language of the instruction are not 
properly before this Court. 
Obviously, prejudice and harm should be made of sterner stuff. Plaintiffs have failed 
to show any prejudice because of the instruction. On this ground alone, their appeal should 
fail. 
The Utah appellate courts have consi stently and for a long time stated and restated that 
the burden to upset a jury verdict is heavy, and that the prejudice must be substantial and 
clear. See, e.g.. Hales v. Peterson. 360 P.2d 822, 824-25 (Utah 1961) Qury verdict should 
not be overturned absent substantial and prejudicial errors); Lemmon v. Denver & R.G. W. R. 
Co.. 341 P.2d 215,217 (Utah 1959) (to set aside jury verdict appellant must meet burden of 
showing error and prejudice); Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756, 
759 (Utah 1978) (a jury verdict will be upset only when error was so substantial and 
prejudicial to case that a different outcome would result); A. K. & R. Wlupple. 977 P.2d at 
522-23 (a court of appeals has obligation to affirm the trial court on any available basis); and 
Pro-Max Dev. Corp. v. Mattsoih 943 P.2d 247, 256 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied 953 
P.2d 449 (error must be substantial and prejudicial.) 
IV. ANY ERROR IN JURY INSTRUCTION 48 WAS CREATED BY PLAINTIFFS 
As suggested earlier in this brief, the Utah Supreme Court in Harris. 671 P.2dat219-
22, in following the authority of Jensen. 611 P.2d at 363, approved the rule stated in 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447. The Restatement section reads in pertinent part: 
§447. Negligence of Intervening Acts 
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done 
in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another 
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, 
if: 
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have 
realized that a third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of 
the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary 
that the third person had so acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation 
created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not 
extraordinarily negligent. 
Though differing in language, Instruction 48 reflects § 447's requirement of the 
foreseeability of the intervening behavior; § 447 expresses this idea in subparagraph (a) 
where it states the actor "should have realized that a third person might so act. . ."; the 
instruction also states, consistent with § 447, that the intervening actor's behavior must be 
extraordinary." It was, principally, the adoption of these two factors which the court stressed 
in Harris. 
The principal difference in Instruction 48 and the formulation of § 447 consists of the 
instruction's use of the language "intentional manner." This "intentional manner" language 
used in Instruction 48 is not consistent with Utah law and the language of negligence, as 
found in § 447 of the Restatement (Second) should have been used. Negligence is the 
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standard adopted by Harris and used again in the Steffensen case, also cited herein. 862P.2d 
at 1346. 
Plaintiffs' brief suggest as pages 28-29 that the " intentional manner' language is 
required by this Court's decision in Bansanine v. BodelL 927 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
A fair reading of Bansanine casts doubt on this assertion. In Bansanine, the plaintiffs 
decedent was shot and killed by the driver of another vehicle. The defendant was the driver 
of the car in which the decedent was riding. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant's reckless 
driving and insulting behavior provoked the violent reaction by the driver of the other car and 
thus was the proximate cause of the accident. 
The trial court granted defendant's summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause. An appeal was taken to this Court, which affirmed the summary judgment. Again, 
the issue was foreseeability of the behavior of the intervening actor. 
This Court cited Restatement (Second) § 442 B (1965) and Section 442 B speaks of 
"harm intentionally caused." However, intentional infliction of harm was not the reason for 
this Court's citation to § 442 B in the Bansanine opinion. The Section was cited for the 
proposition that the risk of shooting and killing arising from the reckless behavior of the 
defendant was not a necessarily foreseeable risk of rude behavior. 
There was no issue of subsequent intentional infliction of harm in the instant case. 
Instruction 48 expressly required intentional conduct for the subsequent act to be a 
superseding cause. This misstatement of Utah law in the instruction that was given could 
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only benefit plaintiffs in this case. 
The evidence at trial showed negligence, not intentional wrongdoing, of Sysco, Aaron 
Gardner's employer. The evidence consisted of essentially three points: 
A. Sysco prepared an internal document to instruct its employees in the operation 
of the dock leveler. The instruction sheet outlined Sysco's "Preferred Work 
Method" for leveler operation; many important safety features were eliminated 
or stated wrongly in this "Preferred Work Method." (Marked as both Trial 
Exhibit 24 and 81; R. 2259-2263; R. 2423 at 129-142.) 
B. Sysco inadequately trained its employees, including Mr. Gardner, in the 
operation of the dock leveler (R. 2423 at 131-134); and 
C. Sysco failed to take any action about an unexplained descent of the dock 
leveler plate at dock 51 that occurred about two weeks prior to the November 
2, 2002 date of Mr. Gardner's accident. (R. 2423 at 168-70.) 
Questions about Sysco's negligence and the proximate cause of injury resulting from 
any such negligence appeared on the special verdict form under question numbers 7 and 8, 
and also under the allocation question number 11. (R. 2270,2271.) Obviously, these facts 
were admitted into evidence on the issue of Sysco's negligence for a proper allocation of 
fault. 
The argument about the meaning of Bansanine and the use of Instruction 48's 
"intentional manner" language is a bit surreal. Plaintiffs defend the requirements of 
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intentional conduct in an instruction which they claim should not have been given even 
though they requested it. There is no reason to confuse the nature of the conduct with 
causation. A subsequent act can break the chain of legal causation whether or not it resulted 
from negligent, reckless or intentional conduct. Nevertheless, there was no claim or evidence 
in this case of intentional conduct that produced a superseding cause of the accident. The 
complained of instruction was limited to intentional superseding causation and this limitation 
benefitted the plaintiffs. More importantly, whatever the instruction's content, arguments 
about the instruction are moot because the jury never considered causation. 
V. ANY CLAIMS ABOUT PRODUCT DEFECT HAVE BEEN LITIGATED AND 
RESOLVED BY THE JURY'S FINDINGS AND THE FINAL JUDGMENT 
ENTERED 
Any ruling on the question of personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada can have 
no effect on SPX. Plaintiffs litigated the question of any alleged defect in the dock leveler, 
including the supposedly defective auxiliary contact block manufactured by Schneider 
Canada. Thus, the substantive claim underlying this appeal's issue of personal jurisdiction 
over Schneider Canada has already been decided in SPX's favor. 
Under res judicata, any further claim against SPX is barred. This is so regardless of 
how this Court rules on the personal jurisdiction issue. Whether or not Schneider Canada is 
now detemiined to be subject to the jurisdiction of Utah courts, products liability issues 
against SPX in this case have been fully and finally determined in SPX's favor. If Schneider 
Canada is now brought into the case, the case must proceed without SPX. Moreover, SPX 
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submits on the basis of collateral estoppel and claim preclusion any claims based upon the 
defective auxiliary contact block against any party, including Schneider of Canada, are also 
barred. See Oman v. Davis School Dist.. 2008 UT 70. ^i 31-33. 194 P.3d 956; Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp.. 2003 UT 13. ^1 33-34. 73 P.3d 325: Collins v. Sandy City Bd of 
Adjustment 2002 UT 77. ^ 12. 52 P.3d 1267 (Utah 2002):Maoris &Assocs.. Inc. v. Neways. 
Inc.. 2000 UT 93. Iffl 35-46. 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000); Salt Lake City v. Silver Pipeline 
Corp.. 913 P.2d 731. 733-34 (Utah 1995). 
CONCLUSION 
In June of 2009, plaintiffs presented to a jury their claims of defect in the dock leveler 
manufactured by SPX's predecessor in interest. The jury rejected those claims and found 
SPX not to be liable on the asserted claims. Plaintiffs now claim on this appeal error only 
in the giving of one jury instruction. 
Because of the jury's liability determination, the instruction did not and could not 
cause the harm of which plaintiffs complain on this appeal. The jury verdict in favor of SPX 
should be affirmed. 
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DATED this 27th day of October, 2010. 
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APPENDIX 
Tab 1 Utah Code Annotated, § 78B-5-817, et. seq. (2009), the Utah Liability 
Reform Act 
Tab 2 Utah Code Annotated, § 78-27-23, et. seq., the former Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act of 1973 
Tab 3 Special Verdict Form 
Tab 4 Instruction 48 as submitted by appellants 
Tab 5 Instruction 48 as given by the trial court 
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Westlaw. 
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-5-817 Page 1 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-37 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*1 Chapter 5. Procedure and Evidence 
*H Part 8. Miscellaneous (Refs & Annos) 
-f § 78B-5-817. Definitions 
As used in Sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
mjury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees, comparative 
negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liab-
ility, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63G, Chapter 7, Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on be-
half of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal representative. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 849, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2233, eff. May 5, 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1476, provides: 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-817 Page 2 
Fonnerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-37 
"Section 1476. Coordinating H.B. 78 with H.B. 63-Superseding amendments. 
"If this H.B. 78 and H.B. 63, Recodification of Title 63 State Affairs in General, both pass, it is the intent of the 
Legislature that the amendments in this H.B. 78 supersede the amendments to the same sections in H.B. 63, ex-
cept that the section renumbering and internal cross references to Title 63 in H.B. 63 supersede and shall replace 
the section numbering and references to Title 63 in H.B. 78 when the Office of Legislative Research and Gener-
al Counsel prepares the Utah Code database for publication." 
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2233, in subsec. (3)(b), substituted "Title 63G, Chapter 7" for "Title 63, Chapter 30d". 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c. 3, § 849 and 
Laws 2008, c. 382, §2233. 
Prior Laws: 
Lawsl986,c. 199, § 1. 
Laws 1994, c. 221, §2. 
Laws 1996, c. 240, §374. 
Laws 1999, c. 95, § 1. 
Laws 2003, c. 131, §70. 
Laws 2005, c. 102, § 30. 
C. 1953, § 78-27-37. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Cause of action and statute of limitations under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, see § 32B-15-301. 
Damages, action for consortium due to personal injury, see § 30-2-11. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
A Step Backwards in Products Liability Law: The Utah Supreme Court and Comment K. Trupp, 1992 Utah L. 
Rev. 101 (1992). 
Case Law Developments: Apportioning the Comparative Fault of Nonparty Joint Tortfeasors. Haslam, 1994 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-817 Page 3 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-37 
Utah L. Rev. 444 (1994). 
The effects of judicial immunization of passive sellers in Sarins v. Butterfi eld Ford and a proposal for the shift-
ing nature of fault. Jason R. Burt, 2005 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 477 (2005). 
The Liability Reform Act: An Approach to Equitable Application. Betebennder, 13 J. Contemp. L. 89 (1987). 
On Causation and Comparison: Medical Malpractice and other Professional Negligence After Sterner Corp. v. 
Johnson & Higgins. Springer, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 355 (2002). 
Sullivan v. Seoular Grain Co. and the 1994 Amendments: Is Joint and Several Liability Really Dead in Utah? 
Edwards, 9 BYU J. Pub. L. 327 (1995). 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 40:8, Retroactive Effect of Comparative Negligence or Fault Prin- ciples. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 42:3, Relationship to Contributory Negligence or Comparative Fault. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 40:47, Plaintiffs Fault as Factor Reducing Recovery. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 41:12, Causation. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 41:37, Reduction of Recovery; Assumption of Risk as Part of Fault. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 42:27, Proportionate Reduction in Damages. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 52:28, Reallocation of Uncollectible Shares. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 52:35, Joinder of Nonparties for Apportionment Purposes. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d PS STATESTATS, State Statutes. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Burden of proof 3 
Causation 4 
Fault 2 
Purpose of statute 1 
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U.CA. 1953 § 78B-5-817 Page 4 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-37 
1. Purpose of statute 
The determination of whether a passive seller of a product can be held strictly liable under the Utah Liability 
Reform Act is based on the trial court's interpretation of a statute, which an appellate court reviews for correct-
ness without deference to the trial court's conclusions. Yirak v. Dan's Super Markets, Inc., 2008, 188 P.3d 487, 
605 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2008 UT App 210. Appeal And Error €^> 842(1) 
Purpose of comparative negligence statute was to abolish contributory negligence as a complete defense and 
thus avoid harshness which sometimes resulted when party seeking redress was himself negligent, but only to a 
minor degree. U.CA.1953, 78-27-37. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 1977, 563 P.2d 1247. Negli-
gence €=> 549(3) 
2. Fault 
Civil conspiracy is a cause of action distinguishable, independent, and unrelated to tort law, and thus, the Liabil-
ity Reform Act (LRA), which required allocation of fault among tortfeasors, did not preempt civil conspiracy as 
a cause of action. Jedrziewski v. Smith, 2005, 128 P.3d 1146, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 2005 UT 85, rehearing 
denied. Conspiracy €=> 1.1 
For purposes of allocating fault under comparative negligence statute, "fault" encompasses both negligent and 
intentional conduct. U.CA.1953, 78-27-37. Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 1998, 952 P.2d 1078, 338 Utah Adv. Rep. 
10. Negligence €==* 549(6); Negligence €^> 549(7) 
Only where plaintiffs negligent conduct was contributing factor in causing injury does comparative negligence 
become defense for defendant. U.CA.1953, 78-27-37. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 1984, 692 P.2d 728. Negli-
gence <C=> 453; Negligence €=? 549(6) 
3. Burden of proof 
Plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing a prima facie case of negligence, including proximate and actual caus-
ation of the injury. Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007, 176 P.3d 446, 594 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2007 UT 
App 406. Negligence C=^ > 1550; Negligence €^> 1568 
4. Causation 
Although the question of proximate causation is generally reserved for the jury, the trial court may rule as a mat-
ter of law on this issue if there is no evidence to establish a causal connection between the alleged negligent act 
and the injury, thus leaving causation to jury speculation. Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007, 176 P.3d 
446, 594 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,2007 UT App 406. Negligence €=> 1713 
The causal connection between the alleged negligent act and the injury is never presumed and is a matter the 
plaintiff is always required to prove affirmatively. Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007, 176 P.3d 446, 594 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*i Chapter 5. Procedure and Evidence 
*li Part 8. Miscellaneous (Refs & Armos) 
.+ § 78B-5-818. Comparative negligence 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined 
with the fault of persons immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the fault of the 
person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78B-5-819(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault at-
tributed to that defendant under Section 78B-5-819. 
(4)(a) The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate the percentage or proportion of fault at-
tributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from suit, and to any other 
person identified under Subsection 78B-5-821(4) for whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault. In 
the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle, the existence of the vehicle shall 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence which may consist solely of one person's testimony. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered only to accurately determine the fault of 
the person seeking recovery and a defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to any liability, 
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
CREDIT(S) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1986, c. 199, §2. 
Laws 1994, c. 221, §3. 
Laws 1999, c. 95, §2. 
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Laws 2005, c. 79, § 1. 
C. 1953, §78-27-38. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Alteration or modification of product after sale as substantial contributing cause, see § 78B-6-705. 
Cause of action and statute of limitations under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, see § 32B-15-301. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
A New Perspective-Has Utah Entered the Twentieth Century in Tort Law? Roberts and Thronson, 1981 Utah L. 
Rev. 495 (1981). 
Case Law Developments: Apportioning the Comparative Fault of Nonparty Joint Tortfeasors. Haslam, 1994 
Utah L. Rev. 444 (1994). 
Comparative Negligence in Suits Against Accountants: A Statutoiy and Policy Analysis. Dahle, 5 BYU J. Pub. 
L. 155(1991). 
The effects of judicial immunization of passive sellers in Sanns v. Butter field Ford and a proposal for the shift-
ing nature of fault. Jason R. Burt, 2005 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 477 (2005). 
The Impact of Alternative Negligence Defense Rules on Litigation Behavior and Tort Claim Disposition. Jen-
nings, 5 BYU J. Pub. L. 33 (1991). 
Intentional Conduct and Allocation of Fault to Nonparties Under Utah's Comparative Fault Statute. Hoppe, 1998 
Utah L. Rev. 583 (1998). 
The Liability Reform Act: An Approach to Equitable Application. Betebennder, 13 J. Contemp. L. 89 (1987). 
Mulherin v. Ingersoll: Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability Cases. Wilkey, 1982 
Utah L. Rev. 461 (1982). 
On Causation and Comparison: Medical Malpractice and other Professional Negligence After Steiner Corp. v. 
Johnson & Higgins. Springer, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 355 (2002). 
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. and the 1994 Amendments: Is Joint and Several Liability Really Dead in Utah? 
Edwards, 9 BYU J. Pub. L. 327 (1995). 
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.: Apportioning the Fault of Immune Employers. Hansen, 1994 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 187 
(1994). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Negligence <£^> 549(1). 
Westlaw Topic No. 272. 
C.J.S. Negligence §§ 262 to 264, 291, 294, 296, 299, 306, 356 to 359, 654. 
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RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 40:34, Plaintiffs Negligence or Fault Not Equal to or Greater Than 
Defendant's. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 40:37, Jurisdictions in Which Comparative Fault Applies to Strict Li-
ability Actions. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 40:47, Plaintiffs Fault as Factor Reducing Recovery. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 42:27, Proportionate Reduction in Damages. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 52:19, Apportiomnent According to Degree of Responsibility. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d PS STATESTATS, State Statutes. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 3 
Amendment of statute 40 
Animals 28 
Apportiomnent 18-27 
Apportiomnent - In general 18 
Apportionment - Cross claims 22 
Apportiomnent - Dismissed parties 25 
Apportiomnent - Immune parties 26 
Apportiomnent - Intentional conduct 24 
Apportionment - Multiple defendants 21 
Apportiomnent - Persons absolved of liability 20 
Apportiomnent - Potentially liable persons 23 
Apportiomnent - Subsequent proceeding 19 
Apportionment - Workers' compensation 27 
Argument and conduct of counsel 45 
Assumption of risk 6 
Bailment 29 
Breach of warranty 30 
Compromise and settlement 12 
Contractual indemnity 15 
Contribution 9 
Cross claims, apportionment 22 
Defenses 39 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-818 Page 4 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-38 
Dismissed parties, apportionment 25 
Equal protection 1 
Exemption from liability 13 
Governmental immunity 14 
Guest statutes, motor vehicles 33 
Immune parties, apportionment 26 
Instructions 46 . . . 
Intentional conduct, apportionment 24 
Intoxicating liquors 31 
Joint and several liability 11 
Jury selection 43 
Last clear chance 7 
Motor vehicles 32-33 
Motor vehicles - In general 32 
Motor vehicles - Guest statutes 33 
Multiple defendants, apportionment 21 
Parties 42 
Persons absolved of liability, apportionment 20 
Pleadings 41 
Potentially liable persons, apportionment 23 
Premises liability 17 
Property damage 36 
Purpose of statute 2 
Questions for jury 44 
Release 16 
Respondeat superior 8 
Restitution 10 
Retroactive application 4 
Review 49 
Right of recovery 5 
Strict liability 35 
Subsequent proceeding, apportionment 19 
Sufficiency of evidence 47 
Summary judgment 37 
Time for apportionment, apportionment 19 
Ultimate facts 38 
Verdict and findings 48 
Workers' compensation, apportionment 27 
Wrongful death actions 34 
1. Equal protection 
Provision of Liability Refonn Act, that allowed recovery for injured plaintiffs from any defendant whose fault, 
combined with fault of persons immune from suit, exceeded fault of plaintiffs did not create unconstitutional 
classification, and thus Act did not violate equal protection or Unifonn Operation of Laws provision of state 
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constitution, where Act served legitimate purpose of balancing economic burdens between injured employee and 
defendant where immune employer was also at fault. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 24; 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-43. Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 2002, 48 P.3d 218, 444 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2002 UT 
36, rehearing denied. Constitutional Law €^> 3751; Negligence C^> 203; Statutes C=^ 74(1) 
2. Purpose of statute 
Purpose of comparative negligence statute was to abolish contributory negligence as a complete defense and 
thus avoid harshness which sometimes resulted when party seeking redress was himself negligent, but only to a 
minor degree. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 1977, 563 P.2d 1247. Negli-
gence ©=> 549(3) 
3. In general 
Where there is no duty, there is no fault to compare or distribute under the comparative fault scheme for negli-
gence. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence C^> 549(5) 
Only when negligence of plaintiff is causally connected to the injury can damages awarded to plaintiff be re-
duced proportionately. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California, 2000, 996 P.2d 531, 387 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 60, 2000 UT 21. Negligence €=^ 452; Negligence €>^> 549(1) 
4. Retroactive application 
Statute eliminating joint and several liability could not be applied to a negligence action brought by roller rink 
patron for injuries occurring prior to statute's effective date, in that statute changed substantive law in effect 
when cause of action arose, creating retroactive effect if applied, and legislature did not expressly direct retro-
active effect. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-3, 78-27-37 to 78-27-43; U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-43 (Repealed). Steph-
ens v. Henderson, 1987, 741 P.2d 952. Public Amusement And Entertainment €^> 11; Statutes €=^> 278.10 
Contributory negligence would be complete defense to action for personal injuries sustained in automobile acci-
dent where accident occurred prior to enactment of comparative negligence statute. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
Smith v. Shreeve, 1976, 551 P.2d 1261. Automobiles €^> 226(1) 
5. Right of recovery 
Under the Liability Reform Act (LRA), a plaintiff may recover as long as the plaintiffs fault is less than the 
combined fault of all others that contributed to the injury. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37(1), 78-27-38. Nixon v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 1995, 898 P.2d 265. Negligence C=? 549(10) 
Statutes governing comparative and contributory fault contemplate that if plaintiff s proportion of fault is less 
than that of defendant, or group of defendants, fact finder is required to determine percentage or proportion of 
fault attributable to each party seeking recovery and to each defendant, and reduce award of damages accord-
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ingly; however, if plaintiff s share of fault exceeds defendant's, plaintiff recovers nothing. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-37 
(2), 78-27-39; U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38 (1993). Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 1994, 886 P.2d 92, certiorari granted 
892 P.2d 13, affirmed 923 P.2d 1350, rehearing denied. Negligence € ^ 549(10) 
In order to prevail on personal injury claim based upon negligence, plaintiff must prove that defendant's negli-
gence was cause of injury and that defendant's negligence was greater than plaintiffs negligence. Reeves v. Gen-
tile, 1991, 813 P.2d 111. Negligence €^> 371; Negligence €^> 549(10) 
6. Assumption of risk 
Assumption of risk is no longer recognized in Utah as a total bar to recovery. Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006, 131 
P.3d 280, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 2006 UT App 50, certiorari granted 138 P.3d 589, affmned 171 P.3d 411, 586 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2007 UT 74, rehearing denied. Negligence €^> 552(1) 
Under Utah's comparative fault system for negligence, the doctrine of assumption of risk, whereby a defendant 
is not liable for his negligence toward a plaintiff who has voluntarily assumed a risk of harm arising from the de-
fendant's negligent conduct, is no longer recognized as a total bar to recovery. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005, 116 
P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence €==? 552(4) 
Assumption-of-risk language is not appropriate injury instruction under comparative negligence statute, but as-
sumption of the risk in the secondary sense is to be treated as contributory negligence. Stephens v. Henderson, 
1987, 741 P.2d 952. Negligence €^> 553; Negligence €^> 1745(1) 
If the elements of assumption of risk are proven in any given case, it might support a finding of high degree of 
negligence on part of the actor", but it must still be compared with the negligence of the opposing party by the tri-
er of the facts. Meese v. Brigham Young University, 1981, 639 P.2d 720. Negligence €^> 549(9) 
In comparative negligence cases, "assumption of risk" is not to be treated separately from contributory negli-
gence. Meese v. Brigham Young University, 1981, 639 P.2d 720. Negligence €^> 552(4) 
"Secondary assumption of risk," which is the unreasonable encountering of a known and appreciated risk and in 
reality an aspect of contributory negligence, is treated in same maimer as contributory negligence for purpose of 
apportioning fault under comparative negligence statute. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hardware Co., 1981, 631 P.2d 865. Negligence €=> 552(4); Negligence €=> 553; Negligence €^> 554.5 
"Assumption of risk," as that term is used in statute providing that contributory negligence shall not bar recov-
ery in a negligence action, is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a known danger. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 1981, 631 P.2d 865. Negligence €^ 553 
For purposes of assumption of risk defense under comparative negligence statute, attention should be focused on 
whether reasonably prudent man in exercise of due care would have incurred risk, despite his knowledge of it, 
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and, if so, whether he would have conducted himself in manner in which plaintiff acted in light of all surround-
ing circumstances, including appreciated risk; then, if plaintiff s unreasonableness is viewed to be less than that 
of defendant, according to terms of comparative negligence statute, any damages allowed shall be diminished in 
proportion to amount of negligence attributable to person recovering. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-37. Jacobsen Const. 
Co., Inc. v. Structo Lite Engineering, Inc., 1980, 619 P.2d 306. Negligence €=> 549(9) 
Under Utah's comparative negligence statute, "assumption of risk" language is not appropriate to describe vari-
ous concepts previously dealt with under that terminology but is to be treated, in its secondary sense, as contrib-
utory negligence; specifically, reasonableness of plaintiffs' conduct in confronting known or unknown risk cre-
ated by defendant's negligence will basically be determined under principles of contributory negligence. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc. v. Structo Lite Engineering, Inc., 1980, 619 P.2d 306. Negli-
gence €=> 552(4) 
The complete bar to recovery which "assumption of risk" once constituted in a negligence action has been abol-
ished by the comparative negligence statute to avoid the harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result of the all-
or-nothing nature of the former rule of law. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-37. Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc. v. Structo Lite En-
gineering, Inc., 1980, 619 P.2d 306. Negligence €=> 552(4) 
In its primary sense, assumption of risk is alternative expression for proposition that defendant was not negli-
gent, that is, there was no duty owed or there was no breach of existing duties; in its secondary sense, assump-
tion of risk is affirmative defense to established breach of duty and as such is phase of contributory negligence. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. Jacobsen Const. Co., hie. v. Structo Lite Engineering, Inc., 1980, 619 P.2d 306. Negli-
gence C^> 553 
7. Last clear chance 
Under Utah's comparative fault system for negligence, the last clear chance doctrine is no longer recognized as a 
total bar to a plaintiffs recovery; rather, the doctrine is used as just one of many factors juries can look to in ap-
portioning fault under the comparative fault scheme. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence € = ^ 530(2); Negligence €^> 549(9) 
On adoption of comparative negligence, the doctrine of last clear chance as a distinct tort doctrine was extin-
guished, although extinguishment does not preclude jury argument as to whether a party may or may not have 
had the last clear chance to avoid injury. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. Dixon v. Stewart, 1982, 658 P.2d 591. Negli-
gence €>^> 530(2) 
8. Respondeat superior 
Liability Reform Act impliedly preempted common law doctrine of respondeat superior, and therefore liability 
of immune employer and employee should not have been combined in determining fault allocation in wrongful 
death action against manufacturer by estate of worker killed while repairing asphalt silo, where Act and common 
law were in conflict, compliance with both was impossible, and application of respondeat superior would nullify 
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effects of section of Act permitting recovery for injured plaintiffs from any defendant whose fault combined 
with fault of persons immune from suit exceeded fault of plaintiffs. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-43. Bishop 
v. GenTec Inc., 2002, 48 P.3d 218, 444 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2002 UT 36, rehearing denied. Negligence €=> 
549(8); Negligence €^> 549(10); Products Liability €>^> 183; Products Liability €^> 214 
Under Utah Liability Reform Act, jury must account for relative proportion of fault of plaintiffs employer that 
may have caused or contributed to accident even though employer is immune from suit under Workers' Com-
pensation Act; such apportionment does not of itself subject employer to civil liability, but merely ensures that 
no defendant is held liable for amount of damages in excess of percentage of fault attributable to that defendant. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60 et seq, 68-3-11, 78-27-37 et seq., 78-27-37(1), 78-27-38 to 78-27-40. Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co. of Utah, 1993, 853 P.2d 877. Negligence €^> 549(8) 
9. Contribution 
Issue of contribution among joint tort-feasors not having been litigated in trial court, it was not incumbent upon 
trial court to compare relevant faulty conduct of those tort-feasors not joined, treated or considered as parties at 
trial. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-39 to 78-27-43, 78-27-37, 78-27-40(2), 78-27-42. Yost v. State, 1981, 640 P.2d 1044. 
Contribution €=> 9(5) 
10. Restitution 
Intervening negligence of police in incorrectly transcribing identification number of impounded vehicle did not 
supersede joyriding defendant's liability under civil conversion theory of recovery, so as to preclude restitution 
award to victim arising from sale of vehicle to third party; police negligence was not so unforeseeable as to su-
persede defendant's fault in causing victim's loss, and but for defendant's criminal act, which resulted in the im-
poundment that created opportunity for transcription error, victim's loss would not have occurred. U.C.A.1953, 
41-la-1311(1), 76-3-201(l)(c-e), (4)(a)(i), 78-27-38. State v. McBride, 1997, 940 P.2d 539, 320 Utah Adv. Rep. 
14, certiorari denied 953 P.2d 449. Sentencing And Punishment €>=> 2143 
Joyriding defendant was not entitled to have restitution obligation to vehicle owner reduced by that portion of 
loss allegedly owing to police department's negligence in incorrectly transcribing identification number of im-
pounded vehicle, which negligence resulted in sale of vehicle to third party, as comparative negligence would 
not be available to defendant in civil conversion action resulting from defendant's intentional criminal act. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-la-1311(1), 76-3-20l(l)(c-e), (4)(a)(i), 78-27-38. State v. McBride, 1997, 940 P.2d 539, 320 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14, certiorari denied 953 P.2d 449. Sentencing And Punishment C=> 2168 
11. Joint and several liability 
Utah Liability Reform Act has abolished joint and several liability. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38. Fanners Ins. Ex-
change v. Parker, 1997, 936 P.2d 1088,314 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. Negligence €^ 484 
12. Compromise and settlement 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-818 Page 9 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-38 
Automobile passengers who entered into judicially approved settlement of tort claims arising out of automobile-
truck collision after earlier trial in which jury allocated 100% of fault among parties pursuant to state's statutory 
comparative fault scheme could maintain subsequent tort action against manufacturers of truck and automobile, 
who were not parties to the first action, for same injuries, arising out of same transaction, where earlier suit was 
dismissed upon settlement and prior to entry of judgment in case. U.C.A.1953, § 78-27-37 et seq. Richardson ex 
rel. Richardson v. Navistar Intem. Transp. Corp., 2000, 8 P.3d 263,402 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 2000 UT 65, answer 
to certified question conformed to 231 F.3d 740. Compromise And Settlement € = > 17(2) 
13. Exemption from liability 
While parties to a contract may generally exempt themselves from negligence liability, the language they use 
must clearly and unequivocally express an intent to limit tort liability in the contract itself; without such an ex-
pression of intent, the presumption is against any such intention, and it is not achieved by inference or implica-
tion from general language. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 comment. Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 
1996, 923 P.2d 1350, rehearing denied. Contracts €=> 114; Contracts €==> 189.5 
14. Governmental immunity 
Third-party complaint brought by school board against city seeking contribution pursuant to comparative negli-
gence statutes in tort action brought against school board was not barred by section of Governmental Immunity 
Act which stated that "no claim hereunder shall be brought by * * * any * * * governmental entity," in that the 
right to contribution provided by comparative negligence laws was not to be equated to the "claim" allowed or 
barred under the circumstances of any given case by Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-39; 
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-21 (Repealed). Madsen v. Salt Lake City School Bd., 1982, 645 P.2d 658. Municipal Cor-
porations C=> 723 
15. Contractual indemnity 
Language and purpose of entire indemnity agreement, together with surrounding facts and circumstances, may 
provide sufficiently clear and unequivocal expression of parties' intent to constitute clear and unequivocal ex-
pression of intent to indemnify parties' for their own negligence; agreement need not contain specific language 
to indemnify for parties' own negligence. Healey v. J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., 1995, 892 P.2d 1047. Indemnity € ^ > 
30(1) 
Indemnity provision of construction contract, requiring subcontractor to indemnify general contractor against 
general contractor's own negligence in claims resulting from subcontractor's performance of contract, was void 
as against public policy and in violation of statute prohibiting indemnification of indemnitee for its sole negli-
gence; clause excepting situations in which general contractor's sole negligence resulted in liability would have 
saved indemnity provision. U.C.A.1953, 13-8-1. Healey v. J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., 1995, 892 P.2d 1047. Indem-
nity € ^ > 30(5) 
Indemnity agreement providing that subcontractor would indemnify general contractor from any and all liability 
resulting from subcontractor's performance was sufficiently clear and unequivocal expression of intent so as to 
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impose indemnification liability upon subcontractor for general contractor's own negligence. Healey v. J.B. 
Sheet Metal, Inc., 1995, 892 P.2d 1047. Indemnity €^> 30(5) 
Because general contractor's liability to employee of welding subcontractor for personal injuries resulting when 
employee stepped off building at place where there was gap in safety cable strung by general contractor was lim-
ited to general contractor's proportion of fault as found by fact finder, indemnity provision binding subcontractor 
to indemnify general contractor from and against all damages arising out of or resulting from the negligent per-
formance of subcontractor's work would not become operative so that general contractor was not entitled to re-
cover on its cross claim for indemnity against subcontractor. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38. Brown v. Boyer-
Washington Blvd. Associates, 1993, 856 P.2d 352. Workers' Compensation €==> 2142.25 
Comparative Negligence Act did not invalidate indemnity agreement between third-party defendant, the employ-
er of injured worker, and third-party plaintiff, for which third-party defendant was drilling oil wells. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-43. Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co, 1983, 658 P.2d 1187. In-
demnity ©=? 27 
16. Release 
Regardless of percentage of liability attributable to particular defendant relative to other defendants, particular 
defendant was liable for total damage of plaintiff reduced by percentage of negligence attributable to plaintiff 
and by the greater of amount of consideration paid by another defendant for release, or amount, if any, by which 
release provided that total claim should be reduced. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-39 to 78-27-43, 78-27-37, 78-27-40(2), 
78-27-42. Yost v. State, 1981, 640 P.2d 1044. Negligence €^> 549(11); Release €^> 38 
17. Premises liability 
Under Utah Liability Reform Act, defendant shopping mall's duty to prevent stranger's assault of mall tenant 
arose only if defendant knew criminal act was likely to occur. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 et seq. Cortez v. University 
Mall Shopping Center, 1996, 941 F.Supp. 1096. Landlord And Tenant €=> 164(6) 
An invitee can reasonably encounter an obvious danger, so that the landowner can be liable under a premises li-
ability theory, even if no ordinance or law compelled the invitee to encounter the danger. Hale v. Beckstead, 
2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence €^> 1037(4); Negligence©^ 1286(8) 
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether landowner who was acting as general contractor for construction of 
his own home had reason to expect that painting contractor would forget the open and obvious danger of second-
floor balcony without railing, would become distracted from the danger, or would reasonably encounter the 
danger despite the risk, precluded summary judgment for owner, in painter's premises liability action relating to 
painter falling when he stepped off balcony. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 
2005 UT 24. Judgment ©=* 181(33) 
The status of invitee, for premises liability purposes, includes business visitors who are invited to enter or re-
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main on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land, 
such as a workman who comes to make alterations or repairs on land used for residence purposes. Hale v. Beck-
stead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence €==> 1037(2); Negligence €==> 
1037(7); Negligence C=* 1076 
A possessor of land may be liable for injuries an invitee sustains if the possessor has reason to believe that the 
invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the 
advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence € ^ > 1037(4) 
Where an invitee's attention may be distracted, such that he will not discover a danger that is open and obvious, 
or will forget what he has discovered, or will fail to protect himself against it, a possessor of land may be liable 
for breaching his duty of care if he fails to warn or to take other reasonable steps to protect the invitee. Hale v. 
Beckstead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22,2005 UT 24. Negligence € = > 1037(4) 
The "open and obvious danger" rule regarding premises liability, as embodied in sections of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts adopted in Utah, defines a landowner's duty to invitees rather than excusing acknowledged 
negligence, and thus, after replacement of Utah's contributory negligence system with a comparative fault sys-
tem, the rule does not act as a complete bar to a plaintiffs recovery; overruling Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 
1275. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence €==> 1037(4); 
Negligence©^ 1303 
Utah follows the premises liability rule, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that a possessor of land is not li-
able to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is 
known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the hann despite such knowledge or obvious-
ness, with the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, 
taken as a factor of importance when detemiining whether the possessor should anticipate hann from a known or 
obvious danger. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence €=> 
1037(4) 
Utah follows the premises liability rule, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that a possessor of land is subject 
to liability for physical hann caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he: (1) knows or by 
the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable 
risk of hann to such invitees; (2) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 
protect themselves against it; and (3) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. Hale v. 
Beckstead, 2005, 116 P.3d 263, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 2005 UT 24. Negligence € = > 1037(4) 
Under comparative fault statute, apportionment of fault in negligence action against store and shopping center 
owners in connection with assault outside store could not include fault of unknown assailant who was not named 
as party defendant. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-39. Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 1998, 952 P.2d 1078, 338 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10. Negligence ©=> 1304 
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General contractor was not liable to welding subcontractor's employee for personal injuries sustained by em-
ployee when he stepped off building where there was gap in safety cable which had been strung by general con-
tractor for any amount in excess of proportion of fault attributable to general contractor, and thus, fact finder 
was required to account for relative proportion of fault of injured employee's employer that might have caused 
or contributed to accident, even though employer was immune from suit under workers' compensation law. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 to 35-1-108, 78-27-38, 78-27-41; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b). Brown v. Boyer-Washington 
Blvd. Associates, 1993, 856 P.2d 352. Negligence €=* 1304 
Establishment of comparative negligence system abolished open and obvious danger rule as absolute bar to in-
jured guest's recovery. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37(2), 78-27-38. Donahue v. Duifee, 1989, 780 P.2d 1275, certiorari 
denied 789 P.2d 33. Negligence €=> 1286(7) 
18. Apportionment-In general 
Under Utah law, joint tortfeasor may not seek allocation of fault in trial of underlying tort unless it has first 
joined codefendant by means of third-party complaint for apportiomnent. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-41. Coiporation of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Queen Carpet Corp., 1998, 5 F.Supp.2d 1246 
. Negligence €^> 549(5); Negligence €=> 1508 
Under Utah Liability Reform Act, all those whose fault could be causative factor to plaintiffs injury may be 
considered in determining percentage attribution of fault. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 et seq. Tietz v. Blackner, 1994, 
157 F.R.D. 510. Negligence C=> 549(8) 
Under Utah Liability Reform Act, all those whose fault could be causative factor to plaintiffs injury may be 
considered in detennining percentage attribution of fault. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 et seq. Tietz v. Blackner, 1994, 
157 F.R.D. 510. Negligence €==> 549(8) 
Under rule of apportionment, in any enhanced-injury products liability case, when a plaintiff provides evidence 
of a defect and evidence that the defect is a factor in enhancing the injury, the trial court shall instruct the jury 
that it must apportion fault between the defendant original tortfeasor and the defendant product seller. Egbert v. 
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 2010, 228 P.3d 737, 650 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 2010 UT 8. Products Liability €==> 208; 
Products Liability <£zz? 435 
Under comparative fault statute, court may consider fault of any person in personal injury action but may alloc-
ate fault only to plaintiffs, defendants, and persons immune from suit. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-39. Field 
v. Boyer Co., L.C., 1998, 952 P.2d 1078, 338 Utah Adv. Rep. 10. Negligence €=> 549(8); Negligence £^> 549(9) 
Under comparative fault statute, court may consider fault of any person in personal injury action but may alloc-
ate fault only to plaintiffs, defendants, and persons immune from suit. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-39. Field 
v. Boyer Co., L.C., 1998, 952 P.2d 1078, 338 Utah Adv. Rep. 10. Negligence €^> 549(8); Negligence €=> 549(9) 
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Under the Comparative Negligence Act, the total negligence of all defendants should be compared to that of 
plaintiff to determine whether a particular defendant is liable. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-37 et seq. Jensen v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 1984, 679 P.2d 903. Negligence € = ^ 549(9) 
19. —- Subsequent proceeding, apportionment 
Under Utah law, joint tortfeasor may not seek an allocation of fault in a subsequent proceeding. Corporation of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Chi'ist of Latter-Day Saints v. Queen Carpet Corp., 1998, 5 F.Supp.2d 1246 
. Negligence € ^ > 549(5) 
Defendant's failure to file a claim for apportionment in the initial tort litigation may, under Utah law, prevent 
that party from ever seeking a comparison of its fault with those of other tortfeasors. Corporation of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Queen Caipet Corp., 1998, 5 F.Supp.2d 1246. Negli-
gence € = > 549(5) 
20. -— Persons absolved of liability, apportionment 
Under Liability Reform Act, if trial court rules as matter of law that codefendant bears no liability, then fact-
finder does not consider that party when apportioning fault. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-38. National Service Industries, 
Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., Inc., 1997, 937 P.2d 551, 315 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, certiorari denied 945 P.2d 1118 
. Negligence € = > 549(9) 
21. -— Multiple defendants, apportionment 
Because of the nature of an enhanced-injury product liability claim and the abolition of joint and several liabil-
ity, a defendant product seller cannot become liable for the entire injury merely by virtue of being a codefend-
ant; the defendant product seller is liable only for the enhanced injury as determined by a fact-finder's apportion-
ment under comparative negligence statute. Egbert v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 2010,228 P.3d 737, 650 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 4,2010 UT 8. Products Liability € = > 164; Products Liability €=> 183; Products Liability €=> 208 
Under the Comparative Negligence Act, the total negligence of all defendants should be compared to that of 
plaintiff to determine whether a particular defendant is liable. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-37 et seq. Jensen v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 1984, 679 P.2d 903. Negligence €==> 549(9) 
Regardless of percentage of liability attributable to particular defendant relative to other defendants, particular 
defendant was liable for total damage of plaintiff reduced by percentage of negligence attributable to plaintiff 
and by the greater of amount of consideration paid by another defendant for release, or amount, if any, by which 
release provided that total claim should be reduced. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-39 to 78-27-43, 78-27-37, 78-27-40(2), 
78-27-42. Yost v. State, 1981, 640 P.2d 1044. Negligence € = > 549(11); Release €==> 38 
22. -— Cross claims, apportionment 
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Under Utah Liability Reform Act, each defendant in a negligence lawsuit is required to file a cross-claim against 
every other defendant, and in turn to answer the cross-claims of every other defendant, simply to preserve the 
right to argue comparative fault prior to trial. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-41. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Queen Carpet Corp., 1998, 5 F.Supp.2d 1246. Negligence €=> 549(5); 
Negligence©^ 1508 
Under Liability Reform Act, trier of fact must take other tort-feasor's culpability into consideration when mak-
ing any damages awards, even if cross-claim is not or could not be filed. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38. National Ser-
vice Industries, Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., Inc., 1997, 937 P.2d 551, 315 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, certiorari 
denied 945 P.2d 1118. Negligence ©^> 549(10) 
23. — Potentially liable persons, apportionment 
Trial court cannot apportion more fault to defendant than that amount of fault attributable to defendant, even if 
defendant refuses to bring other potentially liable defendants into lawsuit. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38, 78-27-39, 
78-27-40(1). Fanners his. Exchange v. Parker, 1997, 936 P.2d 1088, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. Negligence € ^ 549(9) 
Experienced hiker who had led hiking trip with three friends and who had been found not to be personally at 
fault for damage to vehicle driving on road beneath hiking path, which occurred when negligence of one of 
friends caused rocks to slide on to road, could not be held liable for any portion of damage to vehicle, even 
though hiker had refused to join any of friends to action to have their fault apportioned. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38, 
78-27-39, 78-27-40(1). Fanners Ins. Exchange v. Parker, 1997, 936 P.2d 1088, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. Automo-
biles €=> 226(3) 
24. -— Intentional conduct, apportionment 
Under Utah Liability Refonn Act, as predicted by district court, defendant shopping mall that was allegedly neg-
ligent for failing to provide adequate security to mall tenants was not entitled to have its fault compared to or ap-
portioned against intentional tort-feasor who assaulted plaintiff; intent of Utah legislature as expressed in Act's 
definition of term "fault" does not contemplate comparison of negligence (or similar conduct) with intentional 
conduct, and defendant mall's duty was secondary to assailant's conduct and derived from failure to protect 
plaintiff from that conduct. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-38(2), (4)(a), 78-27-39. Cortez v. University Mall Shopping 
Center, 1996, 941 F.Supp. 1096. Negligence €=> 549(7); Negligence €>^ 1304 
For purposes of allocating fault under comparative negligence statute, "fault" encompasses both negligent and 
intentional conduct. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 1998, 952 P.2d 1078, 338 Utah Adv. Rep. 
10. Negligence €==> 549(6); Negligence €^> 549(7) 
25. -— Dismissed parties, apportionment 
Individual or entity dismissed from case pursuant to adjudication on merits of liability issue may not be included 
in apportionment of fault under Utah Liability Reform Act; when such defendant is dismissed due to determina-
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tion of lack of fault as a matter of law, exclusion from apportionment does not subject remaining defendants to 
liability for damages in excess of their proportionate fault inasmuch as, within meaning of statutory definition of 
"fault," there is no "actionable" breach proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages. U.C.A.1953, 
78-27-37(1, 2). Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 1993, 853 P.2d 877. Negligence €^> 549(6); Negligence 
€^> 549(8) 
26. -— Immune parties, apportionment 
Liability Reform Act (LRA) contemplates consideration of fault of immune parties in determining whether 
plaintiff is entitled to recover under comparative negligence provisions. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37(1), 78-27-38. 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 1995, 898 P.2d 265. Negligence €==> 549(8) 
Liability Reform Act (LRA) contemplates consideration of fault of immune parties in determining whether 
plaintiff is entitled to recover under comparative negligence provisions. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37(1), 78-27-38. 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 1995, 898 P.2d 265. Negligence €^> 549(8) 
Under Utah Liability Reform Act, jury must account for relative proportion of fault of plaintiff s employer that 
may have caused or contributed to accident even though employer is immune from suit under Workers' Com-
pensation Act; such apportionment does not of itself subject employer to civil liability, but merely ensures that 
no defendant is held liable for amount of damages in excess of percentage of fault attributable to that defendant. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60 et seq, 68-3-11, 78-27-37 et seq., 78-27-37(1), 78-27-38 to 78-27-40. Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co. of Utah, 1993, 853 P.2d 877. Negligence €=* 549(8) 
27. -— Workers' compensation, apportionment 
Although general contractor was plaintiffs employer and had paid him workers' compensation, jury was prop-
erly allowed to determine general contractor's percentage of negligence in suit by contractor's employee against 
city for accident which occurred on city property, since apportionment of contractor's fault did not subject it to 
civil liability, but merely ensured that city was not held liable for amount of damages in excess of percentage of 
fault attributable to it. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-43. Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 1993, 858 P.2d 995. 
Workers' Compensation C ^ 2237 
28. Animals 
Comparative fault provisions of liability reform act apply to strict liability statute dealing with dog bites. 
U.C.A.1953, 18-1-1, 78-27-37, 78-27-38. S.H. By and Through Robinson v. Bistiyski, 1996, 923 P.2d 1376. An-
imals €==> 66.5(4) 
Although owner is strictly liable for dog bite, plaintiff must be allowed to offer evidence of owner's negligence, 
i.e., disposition and prior activities of dog and owner's knowledge thereof, as well as facts of injury, since com-
parative fault applies to dog bite statute and such evidence is needed for jury to validly establish percentage of 
owner's comparative fault. U.C.A.1953, 18-1-1, 78-27-37, 78-27-38. S.H. By and Through Robinson v. 
Bistiyski, 1996, 923 P.2d 1376. Animals €^> 66.5(4); Animals €^> 74(4) 
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Under comparative fault principles applicable in dog-bite case involving victim under age of seven, jury could 
consider evidence of victim's mother's alleged negligence, even though issue of victim's own negligence was ir-
relevant since children under age seven are incapable of negligence; statute specifically provides that fact finder 
may consider conduct of "any person" who contributed to alleged injury regardless of whether person is immune 
from suit or defendant in action. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38(4)(a). S.H. By and Through Robinson v. Bistryski, 1996, 
923 P.2d 1376. Animals €=> 66.5(4) 
Error by trial court in dog-bite case, to which principles of comparative fault applied, in excluding evidence of 
prior bites could not be deemed harmless; to apportion relative fault, jury had to have sufficient evidence of 
culpability of each party, and since owner raised issue of victim's mother's negligence, it was impossible for jury 
to apportion fault without proffered evidence of owner's negligence. U.C.A.1953, 18-1-1, 78-27-37, 78-27-38. 
S.H. By and Through Robinson v. Bistryski, 1996, 923 P.2d 1376. Appeal And Error €=> 1056.1(10) 
29. Bailment 
Comparative negligence statutes do not change rule that negligence of bailee in handling bailed property is not 
imputed to bailor. Otto v. Leany, 1981, 635 P.2d 410. Bailment €=^ 21 
30. Breach of warranty 
Prior to adoption of comparative negligence statutes, plaintiffs contributory negligence completely barred re-
covery in actions for breach of warranty. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-43. Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 1994, 
886 P.2d 92, certiorari granted 892 P.2d 13, affirmed 923 P.2d 1350, rehearing denied. Contracts €=> 328(1) 
Plain language of statutory provisions governing comparative and contributory fault makes clear that court shall 
consider plaintiffs comparative negligence and comparative assumption of risk in determining liability for claim 
of breach of warranty. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37(2), 78-27-39; U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38 (1993). Intel-west Const, v. 
Palmer, 1994, 886 P.2d 92, certiorari granted 892 P.2d 13, affirmed 923 P.2d 1350, rehearing denied. Contracts 
€=^328(1) 
Contributory or comparative negligence remains valid defense in breach of warranty action; precept has been 
codified by statute. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37(2), 78-27-38. Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 1994, 886 P.2d 92, certior-
ari granted 892 P.2d 13, affirmed 923 P.2d 1350, rehearing denied. Contracts €^> 328(1) 
31. Intoxicating liquors 
Dramshop Liability Act is subject to the dictates of comparative fault statute; mere fact that Dramshop Liability 
Act prescribes form of strict liability rather than traditional negligence does not exclude it from application of 
comparative fault statute; overruling Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111. U.C.A.1953, 32A-14-101(l)(a)(i); 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37(2) (1998). Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000, 996 P.2d 540, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 62, 
2000 UT 22. Intoxicating Liquors £^> 295 
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32. Motor vehicles—In general 
Adoption of comparative negligence statutes did not overrule case law determination that intent behind statutes 
governing liability of person who signs application of minor for motor vehicle permit or license and owner of 
motor vehicle causing or knowingly permitting minor to drive vehicle upon highway was to provide responsible 
party whom innocent third parties could look to when they were injured through negligence of minor and not to 
provide third parties with statutory shield against actions brought by automobile owners for damage to their 
vehicles. U.C.A. 1953,41-2-10(2), 41-2-22. Otto v. Leany, 1981, 635 P.2d 410. Automobiles €=> 226(3) 
33. -— Guest statutes, motor vehicles 
Motor vehicle guests who suffer minor injuries in automobile accident may recover from negligent driver, but 
those who suffer serious injuries may not, except for personal injury protection payments, but if seriousness of 
injury leads to guest's death, heirs are entitled to full recovery; farther, paying passengers may not have protec-
tion if they are part of driver's family or social guest or if court considers payment insufficient, and guest may 
recover in two-car accident if both drivers are negligent, and host driver may have to pay for his share of fault 
under Comparative Negligence Act. U.C.A. 1953, 31-41-1 et seq., 31-41-2, 31-41-3(2), 31-41-4 to 31-41-6, 
31-41-6(l)(a-d), 31-41-7(b), 31-41-9(2), 41-12-1 et seq, 41-12-5(a, d), 54-6-12(2), 54-11-1 et seq, 54-1 l-l(b), 
78-27-37 to 78-27-43; Const. Art. 16, § 5. Malan v. Lewis, 1984, 693 P.2d 661. Automobiles € = > 181(1); Auto-
mobiles <£zz> 181(3); Automobiles €=> 226(3); Automobiles €==> 251.15 
Comparative negligence law has not repealed guest statute by implication. U.C.A.1953, 41-9-1, 78-27-37. 
Critchley v. Vance, 1978, 575 P.2d 187. Automobiles €=> 181(1) 
34. Wrongful death actions 
Under comparative negligence statute, any negligence of decedent is, in effect, imputed to wrongful death 
plaintiff; thus, if decedent is found to be more than 50% negligent all recovery is denied. U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7; 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 (Repealed). Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 1989, 784 P.2d 1152. Death € ^ > 23 
35. Strict liability 
Utah Liability Reform Act (ULRA) precluded a strict liability claim against automobile dealership, which sold 
van in fleet sale to Department of Corrections, when the van's manufacturer was named in the suit brought by 
Department employee, who was injured when Department van in which he was riding rolled several times, and 
when there was no evidence that dealership knew of or contributed in any way to the van's defective condition. 
Sarins v. Butterfield Ford, 2004, 94 P.3d 301, 502 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2004 UT App 203. Products Liability €===> 203 
36. Property damage 
Where it was found that van had been negligently serviced and that such negligence was proximate cause of fire 
and damage sustained, plaintiffs' failure to carry fire extinguisher in van was not contributing factor in causing 
injury, and trial court erred in submitting to jury the question of plaintiffs' comparative negligence. U.C.A.1953, 
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78-27-37. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 1984, 692 P.2d 728. Automobiles €^ 368 
37. Summary judgment 
Trial court's summary judgment decision was inadequate, given its failure to address to what extent, if any, it re-
lied upon Comparative Negligence Act in dismissing negligence claim of pedestrian's survivors, what factual in-
ferences, if any, it drew in reaching its decision, whether it impermissibly weighed evidence or assessed credib-
ility, and why it invaded factfinder's province in apportioning fault or causation. U.CA.1953, 78-27-38; Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001, 34 P.3d 234, 431 Utah Adv. Rep. 7,2001 UT App 
277. Judgment <£zz> \ 86; Judgment €^> 187 
Under Liability Refonn Act, where one codefendant moves for summary judgment against plaintiff on basis that 
it bears no liability, any other defendant must file apportionment cross-claim in order to have standing to oppose 
other codefendant's motion. U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-38. National Service Industries, Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., 
Inc., 1997, 937 P.2d 551,315 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, certiorari denied 945 P.2d 1118. Judgment €==> 183 
38. Ultimate facts 
Ultimate facts in comparative negligence case embrace only negligence, causation and percentages of negli-
gence attributed to plaintiff and defendant, and a plaintiff cannot be held to be contributorily negligent unless his 
negligence is causally connected to the plaintiffs injury. U.CA.1953, 78-27-37. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 1984, 
692 P.2d 728. Negligence €==> 452; Negligence €=^ 549(1) 
39. Defenses 
Under either comparative or contributory negligence regime, acts of client in getting into circumstances, which 
he employs professional to remedy, may not be asserted to avoid liability for professional's own subsequent neg-
ligence. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California, 1998, 135 F.3d 684, amended on denial of rehearing, 
on remand 118 F.Supp.2d 1174. Negligence €=> 502(3); Negligence €=> 549(6) 
Only where plaintiffs negligent conduct was contributing factor in causing injury does comparative negligence 
become defense for defendant. U.CA.1953, 78-27-37. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 1984, 692 P.2d 728. Negli-
gence C ^ 453; Negligence € ^ 549(6) 
40. Amendment of statute 
Amended comparative fault statute would be applied on remand of breach of fiduciary duty action against law 
firm, though amended statute was adopted subsequent to both occurrence of alleged breach and entry of judg-
ment that was reversed, as legislature's intent in amending statute was to clarify statute's original meaning. 
U.CA.1953, 78-27-39(1). Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001, 37 P.3d 1130, 436 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 
2001 UT 107. Attorney And Client €^> 1 
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41. Pleadings 
Motorist's independent third-party complaint against driver of trailing vehicle to recover motorist's damages 
could be pursued in action filed on behalf of passenger against motorist, after appropriate impleader joined trail-
ing driver as party in order to apportion fault of motorist and trailing driver for death of passenger under Utah's 
Liability Reform Act. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.RuIe 18,28 U.S.C.A.; U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-38(4), 78-27-39. Tietz v. 
Blackner, 1994, 157 F.R.D. 510. Federal Civil Procedure €=> 83 
42. Parties 
Motorist could implead driver of trailing vehicle in personal injury action brought against motorist on behalf of 
passenger, in order to apportion comparative fault of motorist and trailing driver under Utah's Liability Reform 
Act for passenger's death in rear-end collision, and in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and expense from 
requiring motorist to sue other driver in separate action and then move to consolidate cases. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.RuIe 14(a), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38(4), 78-27-39. Tietz v. Blackner, 1994, 157 F.R.D. 510. 
Federal Civil Procedure <&z> 291 
43. Jury selection 
Enactment of Liability Reform Act of 1986, and its repeal of contribution among joint tort-feasors, did not 
change requirement that "substantial controversy" exist between codefendants before they are entitled to separ-
ate sets of peremptory challenges. U.C.A.1953, § 78-27-40; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 47(c). Carrier v. Pro-Tech 
Restoration, 1995, 909 P.2d 271, certiorari granted 920 P.2d 1194, affimied 944 P.2d 346, 327 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
. Jury€=> 136(3) 
44. Questions for jury 
Questions relating to proximate cause generally present question of fact to be decided by jury; however, when 
reasonable jurors could not conclude that defendant's actions were proximate cause of plaintiff s injury, proxim-
ate cause may be decided by judge as question of law. House v. Armour of America, Inc., 1994, 886 P.2d 542, 
rehearing denied, certiorari granted 899 P.2d 1231, affirmed 929 P.2d 340, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 40. Negligence 
€==>1713 
45. Argument and conduct of counsel 
On adoption of comparative negligence, the doctrine of last clear chance as a distinct tort doctrine was extin-
guished, although extinguishment does not preclude jury argument as to whether a party may or may not have 
had the last clear chance to avoid injury. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. Dixon v. Stewart, 1982, 658 P.2d 591. Negli-
gence € ^ > 530(2) 
In personal injury action presenting issues under comparative negligence statute, use of word "shackled" in de-
fense argument that defendant should not be shackled with all of the responsibility for the accident, insofar as 
negligence was concerned, was not improper. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 et seq. Anderson v. Bradley, 1979, 590 
P.2d 339. Trial €==> 114 
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46. Instructions 
Question of motorcyclist's contributory negligence was properly submitted to jury in motorcyclist's action 
against truck driver where motorist struck motorcyclist while attempting to pass truck; motorcyclist's own expert 
testified that with more time motorcyclist could have avoided accident. Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 
2004, 86P.3d 752, 493 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2004 UT App 35. Automobiles € ^ * 245(82); Evidence €>^> 571(6) 
If requested, a trial court must inform the jury of the effect of apportioning to the plaintiff 50% or more of negli-
gence it finds in a comparative negligence case, if effect of such instruction will not be to conflise or mislead the 
jury; overruling McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37, 78-27-38; Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rules 49,49(a, b). Dixon v. Stewart, 1982, 658 P.2d 591. Negligence C==> 1746 
In the unusual or complex case where it would lead to confusion or improper jury deliberations, trial court has 
some discretion in including instruction on effect of apportioning complaint to 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in the comparative negligence case. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37, 78-27-38. Dixon v. Stewart, 1982, 658 P.2d 
591. Negligence €=> 1746 
If an instruction on effect of apportioning to plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence found in a comparative 
negligence case is appropriate, it is also proper to instruct the jury to determine total damage figure only and not 
to reduce that sum to reflect their findings on negligence allocation. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37, 78-27-38; Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rules 49, 49(a, b). Dixon v. Stewart, 1982, 658 P.2d 591. Negligence €^> 1746 
47. Sufficiency of evidence 
In action to recover for injuries sustained by pedestrian when struck by defendant motorist's vehicle as pedestri-
an was crossing street, evidence warranted finding that even if pedestrian was within crosswalk boundaries at 
time of impact, such pedestrian, who was wearing dark pants and dark jacket, on dark, cloudy evening and who 
may have relied on peripheral vision rather than looking in direction of the vehicle in question, had been 60% 
negligent. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 et seq. Lamkin v. Lynch, 1979, 600 P.2d 530. Automobiles €==> 244(50); 
Automobiles €==> 244(60) 
48. Verdict and findings 
Even if it was inappropriate under Utah Liability Reform Act to add nonparty to special verdict form before ap-
portioning negligence, any error was harmless where jury found that motorist was not negligent and thus never 
reached issue of apportioning fault. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-38 to 78-27-41. Turner v. Nelson, 1994, 872 P.2d 1021. 
Appeal And Error €==> 1070(2) 
In negligence action brought by employee injured during remodeling project on employer's premises against 
project manager and subcontractor responsible for remodeling work, name of allegedly negligent nonparty em-
ployer should have been included on special verdict form apportioning comparative negligence among respons-
ible parties, even though employer was immune from suit under Workers' Compensation Act, where project 
manager and subcontractor affirmatively alleged negligence on part of both employee and employer. 
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U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60. Dahl v. Kerbs Const. Corp., 1993, 853 P.2d 887. Trial €==> 352.4(6) 
In action brought by contractors building water treatment plant against subcontractors who constructed chemical 
storage tanks on theories of negligence and breach of express warranty wherein jury apportioned by percentage 
fault of each party without differentiating between negligence and breach of express warranty causes of action, 
since same conduct of defendant constituted both negligence and breach of warranty and jury was instructed that 
damages arising from breach of warranty were same as for negligence, finding of assumption of risk applied 
equally to both negligence and warranty claims. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc. v. Structo Lite 
Engineering, Inc., 1980, 619 P.2d 306. Contracts €^> 354; Negligence € ^ 1750 
49. Review 
The application of Liability Reform Act (LRA), in apportioning fault is a legal question of statutory construc-
tion, which the Supreme Court reviews for correctness. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-43. Bishop v. GenTec 
Inc., 2002,48 P.3d 218,444 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,2002 UT 36, rehearing denied. Appeal And Error €=> 842(1) 
Trial court's determination that comparative fault statute required that jury include fault of unknown assailant in 
apportioning fault among parties, in negligence action brought against store and owners of shopping center in 
connection with attack outside store, was question of statutory construction which Supreme Court would review 
for correctness. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 to 78-27-39. Field v. Boyer Co, L.C, 1998, 952 P.2d 1078, 338 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10. Appeal And Error € = ^ 842(1) 
Applicability of comparative fault provisions of Liability Reform Act to strict liability statute dealing with dog 
bites required interpretation of statutory provisions that raised question of law that would be reviewed for cor-
rectness by state Supreme Court. U.C.A.1953, 18-1-1, 78-27-37, 78-27-38. S.H. By and Through Robinson v. 
Bistryski, 1996, 923 P.2d 1376. Appeal And Error €>=> 842(1) 
Whether plaintiff in action under strict liability statute dealing with dog bites could present evidence of negli-
gence on part of defendant on issue of damages was question of law subject to review nondeferentially for cor-
rectness. U.C.A.1953, 18-1-1, 78-27-37, 78-27-38. S.H. By and Through Robinson v. Bistryski, 1996, 923 P.2d 
1376. Appeal And Error €==> 842(6) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-818, UT ST § 78B-5-818 
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FILi i DISTRICT COURT 
Third JiW:.v - - . r | 
By. .^T 
JUN 16 2009 
SALT LAKE (.,(..„,. -t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deputy Clerk 
GINGER GARDNER, individually and 
as guardian of her minor children 
SABRINA LYNN GARDNER; 
HEATHER ANN GARDNER; 
and JOSHUA LEE GARDNER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SPX CORPORATION; HOJ 
ENGINEERING &SALES CO., INC., 
dba DOCK & DOOR SERVICES, 
a Utah corporation; SCHNEIDER 
ELECTRIC HOLDING, INC., 
a Delaware Corporation; 
and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
CASE NO. 040922873 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Attached is the Special Verdict Form which applies to the above case 
Dated: June /^?2009 
By the Court 
feA—-*-
Robert P. Faust 
District Court Judge w, 
nm & 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented. If you find that 
the evidence favors the issues by a preponderance, answer "Yes." If you find that the evidence is 
so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find 
that the greater weight of the evidence is against the issue, answer "No." 
At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the 
same six on each question. As soon as six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each 
question that is required to be answered, your foreperson should sign and date the form and then 
advise the bailiff. 
1. Was Defendant SPX Corporation negligent in the design of its product? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 2. 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, skip Question No. 2 and please proceed 
to Question No. 3. 
2. Was the negligence of Defendant SPX Corporation a proximate cause of Aaron 
Gardner's death on November 2,2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
Please-proceed to Question No. 3. 
3. Did Defendant SPX Corporation manufacture and sell a product that contained a design 
defect that made the product unreasonably dangerous? 
ANSWER: YES NO \f 
If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 4. 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 3, skip Question No. 4 and please proceed 
to Question No. 5. 
4. Was Defendant SPX's unreasonably dangerous product containing the design defect, a 
proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2, 2002? 
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Please proceed to Question No. 5. 
5. Was Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc., d/b/a Dock & Door Services 
negligent as alleged by the Plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 6. 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 5, skip Question No. 6, but read the 
instructions following Question No. 6. 
6. Was the negligence of Defendant HOJ Engineemig & Sales Co., Inc., d/b/a Dock & Door 
Services a proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2, 2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1 and No. 2 and/or answered "Yes" to 
Question No. 3 and No. 4 and/or if you answered "Yes" to Question No. 5 and 
No. 6, then proceed to Question No. 7. If you did not answer "Yes" to those 
Questions, then stop your deliberations and please have the foreperson sign this 
verdict. 
If you answered "Yes" to either Question 2,4 or 6, please proceed to Question 
No. 7. 
7. Was Sysco Intermountain Food Services, Inc. negligent as alleged by the Defendants? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 8. 
If you answered "No" skip Question no. 8 and please proceed to Question No. 9. 
8. Was the negligence of Sysco Intermountain Food, Inc. a proximate cause of Aaron 
Gardner's death on November 2, 2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO . 
Please proceed to Question No. 9. 
9. Was Aaron Gardner negligent as alleged by the Defendants? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
*Wl/l 
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If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 10. 
If you answered "No" skip Question No. 10 and proceed to Question No. 11. 
Was the negligence of Aaron Gardner a proximate cause of his death on November 2, 
2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
Please proceed to Question No. 11 
For each of the following parties you found to be negligent or made a unreasonably 
dangerous product and was a proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2, 
2002, please state what percentage of fault that is attributable to that party, hi other 
words, if you answered either Question No. 1 or No. 2 "No," and answered either 
Question-No. 3 or No. 4 "No", then do not assign any percentage of fault to SPX 
Corporation. If you answered Question No. 5 or No. 6 "No", do not assign any 
percentage of fault to defendant HO J. 
The total of those to who fault is assigned must equal 100%. 
A. SPX Corporation % 
B. HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc., % 
C. Sysco Intermountain Food, Inc. % 
D. Aaron Gardner % 
TOTAL: 100% 
If you did not assign a percentage of fault to either SPX Corporation or HOJ, then stop 
your deliberations and please have the foreperson sign this verdict. 
If you did assign a percentage of fault to either SPX or HOJ, please proceed to Question 
No. 12. 
What amount do you find that would fairly compensate Plaintiffs for the harm suffered 
by the death of Aaron Gardner. When making this decision, do not make a deduction 
from damages for any percentage of fault that you have assessed to Aaron Gardner and/or 
Sysco Intermountain Foods. The judge will make any necessary deductions later. 
ECONOMIC 
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a. Past Lost Wages 
b. Future Lost Wages 
c. Past Fringe Benefits 
d. Future Fringe Benefits 
e. Past Lost Household Services 
f. Future Lost Household Services 
TOTAL: 
NON-ECONOMIC 
A. Ginger Gardner 
B. Sabrina Gardner 
C. Heather Gardner 
D. Joshua Gardner 
TOTAL: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
SUPERSEDING CAUSE. 
SPX Corporation claims that it is not liable for the plaintiffs' harm because of the later 
fault of another party. To avoid liability for the harm, SPX Corporation must prove all of the 
following: 
(1) that the other party's conduct occurred after SPX Corporation's conduct; 
(2) that a reasonable person would consider the other party's conduct extraordinary; 
(3) that SPX Corporation could not foresee that the other party would act in an intentional 
manner; and 
(4) that the harm resulting from the other party's conduct was different from the kind of harm 
that could have been reasonably expected from SPX Corporation's conduct. 
MUJIII: CV210, Alternative A. 
Plaintiffs object to using any instruction on superseding cause. However, should the Court 
choose to use such an instruction, Plaintiffs submit this instruction to be used in lieu of SPX 
Corporation's proposed instruction. 
28 
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47. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE - ALLOCATION OE 
FAULT. 
If you decide that more than one person is at fault, you must decide 
each person's percentage of fault. This allocation of fault must be done on 
a percentage basis, and must total 100%. Each person's percentage should 
be based upon how much that person's fault contributed to the harm. 
You may also decide to allocate a percentage of fault to Aaron 
Gardner. The Plaintiffs' total recovery will be reduced by the percentage 
of fault that you attribute to Mr. Gardner. If you decide that Mr. 
Gardner's fault is 50% or greater, the Plaintiffs will recover nothing. 
When you answer the questions on damages, do not reduce the 
award by Mr. Gardner's percentage of fault. I will make that calculation 
later. 
For example, if you find that Mr. Gardner's own fault was 20 
percent of all fault causing his death, then the Court will reduce the 
Plaintiffs' recovery by 20 percent of the total damages found by the jury. 
On the other hand, if you find that his fault is 50% or greater, then the 
Plaintiffs shall recover nothing. 
48. SUPERSEDING CAUSE. 
Defendants claim that it is not liable for the Plaintiffs' harm because 
of the later fault of another party. To avoid liability for the harm, 
Defendants must prove all of the following: 
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(2) that a reasonable person would consider the other party's conduct 
extraordinary; 
(3) that Defendants could not foresee that the other party would act 
in an intentional manner; and 
(4) that the harm resulting from the other party's conduct was 
different from the kind of harm that could have been reasonably expected 
from Defendants' conduct. 
49. DAMAGE INSTRUCTIONS - CAUTION. 
The fact that I am instructing you concerning damages is not to be 
taken as an indication that I either believe or do not believe that the 
Plaintiffs entitled to recover damages. The instructions in reference to 
damages are given as a guide in case you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover. However, if you 
determine that there should be no verdict against Defendants, then you 
will entirely disregard the instructions given to you upon the matter of 
damages. 
50. DAMAGES. 
If you find the issues in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the 
Defendants, then it is you duty to award the Plaintiffs such amount of 
money that you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly 
and adequately compensate them for the damages they sustained. 
There are two types of damages: economic damages and non-
economic damages. 
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